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Keefer, Philip , and Vlaicu, Razvan —Vote buying and campaign promises
What explains the wide variation across countries in the use of vote buying and policy
promises during election campaigns? We address this question, and account for a number
of stylized facts and apparent anomalies regarding vote buying, using a model in which
parties cannot fully commit to campaign promises. We ﬁnd that high vote buying is as- 
sociated with frequent reneging on campaign promises, strong electoral competition, and
high policy rents. Frequent reneging and low party competence reduce campaign promises.
If vote buying can be ﬁnanced out of public resources, incumbents buy more votes and
enjoy an electoral advantage, but they also promise more public goods. Vote buying has
distributional consequences: voters targeted with vote buying pre-election may receive no
government beneﬁts post-election. The results point to obstacles to the democratic transi- 
tion from clientelist to programmatic forms of electoral competition: parties may not bene- 
ﬁt electorally from institutions that increase commitment. Journal of Comparative Economics
45 (2017) 773–792. Institutions for Development Department, Inter-American Development
Bank, 1300 New York Ave NW, Washington, DC 20577, USA; Research Department, Inter-
American Development Bank, 1300 New York Ave NW, Washington, DC 20577, USA.
© 2017 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.
1. Introduction
Vote buying is a common practice in democracies, but its use varies widely across countries. The fraction of respondents 
to a global survey who said that vote buying occurred often in their country ranged from 12 percent in the OECD to 56 
percent in South Asia; and from 4.3 percent of Dutch respondents to 75.8 percent of Brazilian. 1 What explains the large 
variation across countries in the use of vote buying? The literature on vote buying has mostly focused on the effectiveness 
of this strategy from the politicians’ perspective, given the costs and reciprocity issues it raises. To account for the emer- 
gence of vote buying, the literature emphasizes politician incentives to target beneﬁts to individual voters. From the voter’s 
perspective, however, a key feature of vote buying is that its beneﬁts are obtained pre-election, circumventing the commit- 
 We would like to thank Gustavo Bobonis, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, Marek Hanusch, Julien Labonne, Daven Petitte, and Thomas Stratmann for their
comments, and participants at the Econometric Society NASM, RIDGE/LACEA-PEG, Georgetown GCER, and University of British Columbia for feedback. We
are particularly grateful for the careful comments and useful suggestions of an anonymous referee. The ﬁndings and interpretations in this paper are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank or the governments it represents.
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1 The World Values Survey, Wave Six (2010–2014).
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Alongside the spread of democracy in the developing world, vote buying has emerged as
an integral part of election campaigns. Yet, we know little about the causes of vote buying
in young democracies. In this paper, we analyse the sources of vote buying in sub-Saharan
African. Using data from the Afrobarometer, we focus on the impact of poverty on vote
buying at the individual- and country-level. Results from multilevel regressions show that
poor voters are signiﬁcantly more likely to be targets of vote buying than wealthier voters.
This effect increases when elections are highly competitive. Thus, micro-level poverty
seems to be an important source of vote buying in Africa and has major implications for
the way electoral democracy operates.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Vote markets used to be widespread during the early
stages of democracy inWestern Europe, but largely seemed
to disappear with economic development (Aidt and Jensen,
2012). In recent decades, new waves of democratization
have occurred around the globe, bringing democracy well
beyond the borders of the Western world. While these
transitions are usually celebrated, they have also lead to
renewed debate about the operation of democracy in
developing countries. Indeed, alongside transitions to de-
mocracy, vote buying – understood as the direct exchange
of money or gifts for votes – has made a powerful return to
the scene of democratic politics. Reports of vote buying
come from most regions of the world, including Asia
(Hicken, 2007), Africa (Bratton, 2008; Vicente and
Wantchekon, 2009), the Middle East (Blaydes, 2006), and
Latin America (Brusco et al., 2004; Stokes, 2005; Gonzales-
Ocantos et al., 2012). Thus, vote buying seems to be an in-
tegral feature of electoral politics in new democracies
across the world. In this paper we contribute to this liter-
ature by providing new evidence on how vote markets
operate in elections with de jure secret ballot, with a
particular focus on the relationship between poverty and
voters’ experience with being offered pre-election rewards
in return for votes.
Vote buying is a particular form of political clientelism,
i.e. the direct exchange at the individual level of rewards
and material goods by political patrons in return for elec-
toral support by voters (Stokes, 2007a; Hicken, 2011; Linos,
2013; Robinson and Verdier, 2013). It is widely accepted
that clientelistic politics create economic inefﬁciencies,
reduce the supply of public goods, and bias public policy in
favour of elites (Stokes, 2007a; Vicente and Wantchekon,
2009; Robinson and Verdier, 2013). Vote buying also rai-
ses questions about the character of democracy. While
elections involving vote buying may be ‘free’ – allowing
voters to choose between multiple candidates in elections
with universal suffrage – they collide with standards of
democratic ‘fairness’, because the interests of some voters
are bought by parties before the election, and may
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ45 3815 3564.
E-mail addresses: psj@sam.sdu.dk (P.S. Jensen), mkj.dbp@cbs.dk
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This study investigates the concept of vote buying, with a particular focus on its usage in
research on clientelism. Vote buying is often poorly deﬁned. Such conceptual ambiguity
may distort descriptive ﬁndings and threaten the validity of causal claims. Qualitative
analysis suggests that researchers often employ the concept of vote buying differently, and
regressions from Nigeria and Mexico suggest that using alternative deﬁnitions can yield
divergent empirical results. This diverse usage also poses the risk of conceptual stretching,
because scholars often use vote buying to describe other phenomena. To improve future
research, analysts should pay close attention to the conceptualization of vote buying.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Use of the term “vote buying” has increased sharply in
recent decades. Its mention in published books has quin-
tupled since 1980 (see Fig. 1), and over 10,000 recent aca-
demic articles and unpublished manuscripts mention the
term.1 This study investigates the concept of vote buying,
with a particular focus on its usage in research on cli-
entelism. We build on inﬂuential qualitative work that re-
veals how conceptual ambiguity can undermine scholarly
research (e.g., Sartori, 1970; Collier and Levitsky, 1997;
Levitsky, 1998). Although many recent studies continue to
advance our understanding of clientelism, they are often
imprecise about what constitutes vote buying. This lack of
conceptual clarity may distort descriptive ﬁndings and
threaten the validity of causal claims. Our qualitative
analysis suggests that researchers often employ the
concept of vote buying differently, and regressions from
Nigeria and Mexico suggest that using alternative deﬁni-
tions can yield divergent empirical results.
Diverse use of the term “vote buying” also poses the risk
of conceptual stretching (Sartori, 1970). Scholars employ
the term to describe various political phenomena, such as
paying cash to voters on Election Day (Lehoucq, 2007),
inducing legislators to support NAFTA (Evans, 2004),
increasing pensions for all elderly citizens (Thames, 2001),
and paving roads in co-ethnic districts (Burgess et al.,
2012). We develop a typology of four distinct ways in
which vote buying is used in the scholarly literature, and
argue that two of these categories involve conceptual
stretching. Studies should clarify how they use vote buying
in order to reduce conceptual ambiguity, as well as to
improve descriptive and causal inference. They should also
pay close attention to potential heterogeneity, as pre-
dictions and ﬁndings do not necessarily apply across cate-
gories of vote buying.
The present article aims to alleviate conceptual ambi-
guity about vote buying, with a particular focus on how the
concept is used in the ﬁeld of clientelism. To this end, we:
(1) identify key differences in how recent studies deﬁne
clientelist vote buying; (2) examine how these different
deﬁnitions can affect empirical results; (3) develop a ty-
pology of the broader usage of vote buying in political
* Tel.: þ1 858 354 1854; fax: þ1 858 534 7130.
E-mail address: nichter@ucsd.edu.
1 The caption of Fig. 1 describes the data about the growth in usage of
the term “vote buying.” The number of scholarly works using the term is
from Google Scholar (March 2014).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Electoral Studies
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/e lectstud
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.02.008
0261-3794/ 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Electoral Studies 35 (2014) 315–327
Where is vote buying effective? Evidence from a list experiment
in Kenya*
Eric Kramon
Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, United States
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 5 May 2016
Received in revised form
13 August 2016
Accepted 26 September 2016
Available online 11 October 2016
a b s t r a c t
Vote buying is common in democracies around the world. Yet relatively little is known about the con-
ditions in which vote buying is an effective campaign strategy, in part because vote buying is challenging
to measure. This paper examines the local economic and social conditions in which vote buying in-
ﬂuences the behavior of voters in Kenya. I combine data from a nationally representative list experiment
conducted after Kenya's 2007 elections with highly disaggegrated census data about local economic and
social conditions. While 7 percent report that vote buying inﬂuenced their vote when asked directly, the
list experiment ﬁnds that 23 percent were inﬂuenced. I ﬁnd mixed evidence and statistically weak ev-
idence that vote buying is more effective in the local areas where parties should be best able to monitor
voters. Vote buying is, however, most effective where voters lack access to information about politics. I
discuss the implications of the results for literature on vote buying, clientelism, and electoral
accountability.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Politicians attempt to exchange money for votes in many de-
mocracies around the world.1 Yet, despite its prevalence, empirical
evidence on whether vote buying is an effective campaign strategy
is mixed. This paper contributes by examining the local social and
economic conditions in which vote buying is an effective campaign
strategy. Under what conditions does vote buying inﬂuence the
voting decisions of voters?
This question has direct implications for democratic account-
ability, representation, and the quality of governance. When poli-
ticians and parties can win votes with cash handouts at election
time, rather than by performing well while in ofﬁce, the account-
ability relationship between voters and their representatives
breaks down. In the worst instances, vote buying may produce a
form of “perverse accountability,” whereby vote-buying political
parties hold voters accountable for their voting behavior (Stokes,
2005). Moreover, vote buying is likely to undermine the political
representation of poor voters who are often the targets of vote-
buying efforts (Stokes, 2007). As a result, vote buying may
diminish the incentives of governments to be responsive to the
needs of those living in poverty (Khemani, 2012).
While this question is of clear importance and relevance to
debates about the drivers of weak accountability in democratic
contexts, data limitations have made it a difﬁcult one to address.
Vote buying is often illegal and generally in violation of well
recognized norms about how both politicians and voters should
behave in a democratic society. Given the sensitivity of vote buying,
survey and interview questions designed to measure its effective-
ness are likely to be inﬂuenced by “social desirability bias”
(Bradburn et al., 1978; DeMaio,1984; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012;
Tourangeau and Yan, 2007).2 This poses a challenge to the mea-
surement of vote buying and, because response bias may be
concentrated among speciﬁc sub-groups of the population
* This research was supported by a National Science Foundation Doctoral
Dissertation Improvement Grant (Award Number: 1122700). I thank Adam Ziegfeld,
two anonymous reviewers, and Thomas Scotto for their very helpful feedback on
previous versions of this paper.
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1 Vote buying has been documented in contemporary Latin American countries
such as Argentina (Auyero, 2001; Brusco et al., 2004), Mexico (Magaloni, 2006), and
Nicaragua (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012); Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt
(Blaydes, 2010), Jordan (Lust-Okar, 2006), and Lebanon (Corstange, 2010); in Asian
countries such as the Philippines (Khemani, 2012) and Taiwan (Wang and Kurzman,
2007); and in African countries such as Benin (Banegas, 2002), Ghana Nigeria
(Bratton, 2008), S~ao Tome and Príncipe (Vicente, 2014), and Uganda (Conroy-Krutz
and Logan, 2012).
2 Social desirability bias occurs when survey or interview respondents provide a
socially acceptable, rather than a truthful, answer to questions about sensitive at-
titudes and behaviors.
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This paper provides evidence that vote buying in poor democracies is associated with lower investments in
broadly delivered public services that have been shown to disproportionately beneﬁt the poor. Using detailed
data around the local institutional context in the Philippines, the paper shows how the correlation can be
interpreted as arising in equilibriumunder conditions of clientelism,whenpolitical strategies emphasize the pro-
vision of targeted beneﬁts in exchange for political support. In placeswhere households reportmore vote buying,
government records show thatmunicipalities invest less in basic health services formothers and children; and, a
higher percentage of children are recorded as severely under-weight. Corroborating evidence is provided using
Afrobarometer surveys across 33 countries. Taken together, the evidence shows that where politicians purchase
political support through targeted transfers, they are likely to trade it off against the provision of broader public
services on which poor people rely.
© 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Political economy explanations for under-investment in pro-poor
policies have focused on the notion of elite capture.1 However, as re-
cently argued by Anderson et al. (forthcoming) and Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2012), explanations that rely solely on elite capture ap-
pear inadequate in contexts of competitive political institutions where
elected leaders depend upon the votes of the poor to gain and remain
in ofﬁce. In these contexts, a source of weak political incentives to deliv-
er broad public services to the poor has been attributed to clientelist
practices of purchasing political support through targeted transfers, or
through explicit vote buying at the time of elections (Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2012; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2008; Schaffer, 2007;
Stokes, 2005, 2007; Vicente and Wantchekon, 2009).2
The offering of “gifts” or money in exchange for votes at the time of
elections has been found to bewidespread in poor democracies, despite
the existence of secret ballots. Much of the literature on vote buying has
been occupied with the question of how, even in the presence of secret
ballots, vote buying might function and be appealing as a political
strategy.3 The equilibrium consequences for public policy performance
Journal of Development Economics 117 (2015) 84–93
☆ This paper is based on research that was undertaken to support local governance and
service deliverywork led by YasuhikoMatsuda in the East Asia region of theWorld Bank. I
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port, feedback, and guidance on country context and policy implications of the analysis. I
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Centre for Policy Research, NewDelhi, and at the Indian Statistical Institute, for very useful
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World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
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1 See for example: Araujo et al., 2008; Bardhan andMookherjee, 2005; and Galasso and
Ravallion, 2005.
2 The term “clientelist” is used here in a general sense, as described by Kitschelt and
Wilkinson (2008, pp2)—“clientelist accountability represents a transaction, the direct ex-
change of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employ-
ment, goods, and services”. That is, clientelism in the Kitschelt–Wilkinson deﬁnition
includes both post-election transfer of beneﬁts as well as pre-election buying of votes.
Vicente andWantchekon (2009) distinguish between “clientelism” and “vote buying”, al-
though both involve a quid-pro-quo exchange between delivering private favors in ex-
change for political support. Clientelism is deﬁned in their paper as an exchange of votes
for favors conditional on being elected (e.g., jobs in the public sector), and vote buying
as votes for cash before an election. However, they blame both (or each)with reducing po-
litical incentives for broad public goods. Nichter (2011) deﬁnes vote buying strategies as
“electoral clientelism” and distinguishes it from “relational clientelism” in which beneﬁts
are provided on a longer term basis (rather than just at election times) in exchange for po-
litical support. Anderson et al. (forthcoming) study this form of relational clientelism in
India.
3 Some recent contributors are: Finan and Schechter (2012), Gonzalez-Ocantos et al.
(2012), Larreguy (2013), Nichter (2008, 2011), Vicente (2010) andWeitz-Shapiro (2012).
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CONSISTENCY AND VOTE BUYING: INCOME,
EDUCATION, AND ATTITUDES ABOUT VOTE
BUYING IN INDONESIA
Abstract
This article examines ambivalence—the simultaneous holding of two or more conflicting values or
beliefs about a political issue—among Indonesian citizens’ attitudes about vote buying. Using an
original survey taken during the 2014 Indonesian elections, we analyse the factors related both to
citizens’ normative views about vote buying and their willingness to accept gifts from candidates.
A large number of citizens demonstrate ambivalence by viewing the practice as unjustified or
corrupt and yet expressing willingness to accept money from candidates. We also examine the dif-
ferential effects of education and income on these attitudes. Consistent with “demand side” theories
of vote buying, low income creates economic pressure to accept money but does not influence nor-
mative attitudes about vote buying. Education, however, has a broader effect by influencing both
normative attitudes and willingness to accept money. We consider implications of these results for
Indonesian officials focused on reducing vote-buying behavior.
Keywords
vote buying, Indonesian politics, Indonesian elections, public opinion, ambivalence, Southeast
Asia politics
INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of vote buying—where candidates and intermediaries distribute com-
modities or money to citizens in exchange for their votes—has been known to Indonesian
scholars for decades. While long viewed as a corrosive and corrupting influence on Indo-
nesian politics, more recent scholarship has begun to focus on the nuances and complex-
ities of vote buying. For example, Fionna (2014) found that intermediaries or “brokers”
who distribute money on behalf of candidates often target the most persuadable voters
and those who could be persuaded to vote in an upcoming election.1 Other research
has examined the “demand” side of vote buying to determine which voters are most
likely to prefer receiving payments from candidates as opposed to broad-based public
policies (Shin 2015). Underlying much of this research is a presumption that the practice
of vote buying undermines government effectiveness (Hicken and Simmons 2008) and is
normatively antithetical to classic conceptions of democracy. Government agencies such
as the Komisi Pemilihan Umum (or KPU) and the Kesatuan Bangsadan Politik (or
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Abstract
Recent literature suggests that the poor are more likely to be targeted for vote buying and to sell
their votes. However, there is limited empirical analysis on the patterns of vote buying among low-
income voters. This paper attempts to fill this gap using a survey conducted in Metro Manila,
Philippines after the 2016 elections. Data analysis shows that vote buying among the poor is indeed
very common, but the incidence varies depending on the vote buying type. The most prevalent
form uses more benign goods such as food and clothing, but offers of money is still reported by
more than a quarter of respondents. Different vote-buying types also have different correlates,
including some socio-economic factors, suggesting that it is a finely targeted activity. In addition,
money vote buying is predominant in tight elections, but buying votes using non-monetary offers is
more common when there is a clear winner even before the election. Most of those who were
offered accepted the goods or money, but only about two-thirds voted for the candidate. In
addition, evidence suggests that the good or money is not the deciding factor in voting for the
candidate. This supports the premise that vote buying is just part of a bigger effort by politicians to
build clientelism and patronage among his/her constituencies. Dependency and loyalty is merely
punctuated by election-related transfers, rather than an effort to completely change votes.
Keywords
Vote buying, elections, election fraud, philippines
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Abstract 
Many scholars view vote buying as a simple economic transaction: parties and candidates 
distribute material benefits to individual citizens in exchange for support at the ballot box. 
Drawing upon a variety of comparative experiences, this paper argues, however, that the 
commercial aspirations of vote buyers often run into objective as well as intersubjective 
barriers. On the objective side, seller compliance is uncertain as vote buying does not take 
place within a “normal” market protected by social and legal norms. On the intersubjective 
side, electoral practices that outside observers describe as “vote buying” may carry very 
different meanings in different cultural contexts. To assess empirical claims as well as 
normative judgments about vote buying, the paper concludes, we need to be aware of the 
potential gap between our idealized, commercial model of vote buying and the way it 
actually works in the world. 
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism
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Social Influence and Political Behavior in Mozambique* 
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Abstract: 
Political accountability requires electoral participation and informed voters. Both 
have been lagging in Mozambique. We designed and implemented a field 
experiment during the municipal elections of 2013 in that country. We study the 
impact on political behavior of social influence through individual text messages 
aimed at mobilizing voters, and of location-level distribution of a free newspaper. 
Importantly, we randomly assign peers, i.e., a quasi-network, to experimental 
subjects in order to test for exogenous peer influence via text messages. 
Measurement of political outcomes comes from behavioral measures related to 
the sending of SMSs by subjects, and from voter behavior based on survey 
information or the replication of the voting procedure. We find positive effects of 
the text messages, namely of those coming from male and older peers, on political 
participation and voting for the ruling party. However, we do not find clear 
evidence that the strength of the messages or homophily played a role. We find 
positive effects of the distribution of the newspaper on political participation, and 
positive interaction effects between the influence from peers and newspaper 
distribution. 
 
JEL Codes: D72, O55. 
Keywords: Voter Education, Social Networks, Mobile Phones, Newspapers, 
Political Economy, Randomized Experiment, Field Experiment, Mozambique, 
Africa. 
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